Introduction
Nearly two décades after the advent of glasnost' in the Soviet Union, Indigenous 1 Northerners in Russia are recognized as participants in the international arena of Indigenous activism (Kohler and Wessendorf 2002; Pika et al. 1996) . From ail appearances, Chukotka's Indigenous activists in the 2000s are no less a part of this. However, as this paper argues, conditions for Indigenous activism in Chukotka are significantly différent from conditions in the other parts of the circumpolar North outside Russia, such as Alaska, to which Chukotka is often compared. I would further argue that Chukotka is even a bit différent from the rest of the Russian North. One of the keys to understanding thèse différences as they are today lies in the events of the 1990s, when Chukotkan Indigenous activists were adjusting to the multiple changes confronting them. This paper deals specifically with the events of that period.
Perhaps more than anywhere else in Russia, Chukotka's Indigenous activists in the 1990s were not only engaged in a struggle to secure rights to land and to their preferred way of life, as were other Indigenous persons in Russia, but they also faced an attack on their very ability to voice dissent, Le. to be activists at ail. In this paper 2 ,1 explore this difficult situation by first contextualizing the Indigenous movement of the late 1980s and 1990s in Chukotka within the broader phenomenon of Indigenous activism in Russia, highlighting the key rôle played by élite intellectuals {intelligentîf'.
I then go on to examine the specificities of Indigenous activism in Chukotka, including the rôle played by a chauvinistic régional administration that employed disauthenticating discourses 4 to undermine the Indigenous movement. I am arguing that one of the key explanations for why Chukotka's Indigenous movement initially faltered was not only the belligerence of this local administration, but also the way that Chukotka's Indigenous activists were caught off guard by the new post-Soviet logic that developed in the région. Because Indigenous activism in Chukotka in the early 1990s was most naturally an extension of Soviet-era activism, it was initially unprepared for the new logic of a nominally "démocratie" Russia.
The beginnings of transnational Indigenous activism in Russia
Transnational Indigenous activism has been taking shape throughout the world since the 1970s, and Indigenous Northerners have been involved from the beginning (McFarlane 1993: 160; Sanders 1980: 4) . However, it was only much later that Indigenous activists in the Russian North were able to form links to this transnational phenomenon. Open and critical activism was risky in the pre-glasnost ' Soviet Union (cf. Sedaitis and Butterfield 1991: 1) , but Soviet Président Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost' allowed Russia's Indigenous activists to begin to communicate more freely with their counterparts in the rest of the world and to share new-and more sharply critical-ideas about Indigenous rights within the Soviet Union.
Very quickly in the late 1980s, a plethora of published material appeared that bore witness to the growing political consciousness among Indigenous activists in the Russian North (Vakhtin 1994: 70-72) . The speeches of Indigenous political représentatives in the national législatures of both the Soviet Union and the Russian Soviet Republic addressed the unique problems of the group that was defined by the Soviet state as the malochislennye narody Severa ('Less-Numerous Peoples of the North') (e.g., Aipin 1991; Etylen 1989) . The writings of Indigenous intellectuals, published in newspapers and magazines, decried the poor conditions of Indigenous Northerners and called for change (Achirgina-Arsiak 1992; Rytkheu 1988; Sangi 1988) . Thèse were echoed by the writings of a few concerned ethnographers who could, "for the first time in their careers, explicitly associate themselves with the welfare of 'their peoples' in opposition to state interests and in support of the Indigenous intelligentsia" (Slezkine 1994: 371-372) . In particular, a watershed article published in the national Soviet newspaper Kommunist by the late ethnographer Aleksandr Pika and Boris Prokhorov stirred great interest as it described conditions in the North that contradicted ail of the success stories that had been told about the Peoples of the North (Pika and Prokhorov 1988) 5 .
This new activism in Russia led to the organization in March 1990 of a nationallevel (vse-rossiiskii or 'all-Russia') Congress of Peoples of the North in Moscow. At this congress, the Assotsiatsiia malochislennykh narodov Severa ('Association of LessNumerous Peoples of the North') was established-the moniker "Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North," with its much more pronounceable acronym RAIPON, would be invented later. The Nivkh writer Vladimir Sangi, who reputedly originated the idea as early as 1988, was elected to be the founding président (Pika and Prokhorov 1988) 6 . In its charter, the Association is declared to be "a political organization uniting the small [sic] peoples of the North to take an active part in the development of the economy" (IWGIA 1990: 47) . A program was also outlined at the congress, and one of its clauses acknowledged the need for international coopération: "The Association will base its activities not solely on Soviet but also international expérience, in order to bring Soviet législation on national relations in agreement with the Universal Déclaration on Human Rights and other international documents" (IWGIA 1990: 56) . The congress was surrounded by a flush of international attention (Glebov and Crowfoot 1989; Korobova 1991; Luk'iachenkho and Novikova 1991; Schindler 1992; Shinkarev 1990) .
There seems to be some poetic symmetry to this, as if, with the addition of Russia's Indigenous peoples to the common struggle for rights, the last link had been added that would "close the circle" of the circumpolar North in terms of Indigenous politics. It might be tempting to assume that Indigenous politics in the Russian North are one and the same with the rest of the circumpolar North. Indeed, the rhetoric of activists is often quite similar, with common issues on the agenda: rights to land; control of resources; désire for autonomy and self-government; préservation of native language; culture and "traditional" économies. Indigenous activists in Russia and in the rest of the circumpolar North have actively sought one another out in order to work together on thèse issues. However, strong caveats are in order here so as to avoid mistaken assumptions and false équivalences. A key différence to consider, particularly when examining national-level Indigenous activism in Russia, is the fact that most of the Indigenous activists who arose in Russia in the late 1980s were not only Moscowbased intellectuals, but they had enjoyed comparatively élite positions prior to glasnost' by virtue of their positions in the Soviet Writers' Union or in the Communist Party. This should by no means be read as cynicism toward their position: it is merely a statement of fact. Others, such as the Chukchi activist Vladimir Etylin, were based in the far-flung régions of the North, but had strong ties to Moscow by virtue of their involvement in national-level politics. They were well educated and, when compared to Indigenous populations in other parts of the North, relatively well enfranchised in the sensé of being generally endowed with the rights of Soviet citizenship 7 .
This Indigenous intelligentsia began to appear in the Soviet Union as early as the 1920s. A number of studies have elaborated the history of Soviet colonization in the Russian North, and the far-reaching effects (both positive and négative) of the Soviet éducation System on Indigenous persons (e.g., Balzer 1999; Bloch 2003; Grant 1995; Gray 2005; Slezkine 1994; Vakhtin 1994) . For the most part, the Indigenous intelligentsia in Chukotka, as in other parts of the Russian North, was a deliberate création of the Soviet state, a centrally planned "product" (Slezkine 1994: 157; Uvachan 1990: 45) . In the words of Anatolii Lunacharskii, the Soviet Commissar of This is a relative statement. It might be argued that very few Soviet citizens, indigenous persons included, were genuinely enfranchised. But one thing the Soviet System did accomplish on behalf of indigenous persons was to provide many of them with an excellent éducation, and to promote a few of them to élite status, and celebrate them. Many of those I interviewed told me that they appreciated this, sometimes in the same breath with criticism of the Soviet state for its other policies toward Indigenous peoples. Thèse tended to be the persons who most actively promoted the indigenous movement in the Russian North.
Education in the 1920s, "We cannot move ahead if we will not work intensively on the création of the Indigenous peoples' own intelligentsia" (quoted in Udalova 1989: 101) 8 . The speeches of Indigenous politicians in the Soviet period were rhetorically indistinguishable from the speeches of their Russian counterparts; the poems, stories and novels of Indigenous writers often reflected the thèmes and styles of the Russian writers they read in the course of their training, such as Pushkin, Chekhov and Tolstoi (e.g., Rytkheu 1956; cf. Slezkine 1994: 369) .
For thèse élite intellectuals, it was a more or less natural move to become involved in the Worldwide Indigenous movement. Thèse Moscow-focused Indigenous activists had a political agenda, and they put much effort into drafting législation in Russia that clarified the status of Indigenous peoples, as well as lobbying the Russian législature to pass that législation. Ironically, rather than actually providing leadership to Indigenous persons ail across Russia, the high-profile Indigenous activists seemed to have had greater impact outside of Russia. They were most effective in drumming up a heightened consciousness abroad of the plight of Indigenous peoples in Russia, employing what Keck and Sikkink (1998: 12) have termed the "boomerang pattern" to "bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside." They became quite well traveled, and even local intellectuals from Chukotka gained remarkable access to sites around the world after glasnost '.
However, the Moscow-based activists were far less effective in drumming up a similarly heightened consciousness among Indigenous persons within Russia, especially in the far-flung régions beyond Moscow. When I interviewed the Moscowbased Association président Eremei Aipin in Moscow in 1996, he openly admitted that it was far too much for him to monitor what ail of the régional Indigenous associations were doing. The poor communications infrastructure in the country, and his organization's tiny budget, made it almost impossible for him to maintain regular contact with the régions. This rather grim state of affairs for the Association in Moscow would not last long-by the end of the décade, the Association would successfully tap into the resources of transnational organisations, and with large infusions of grant money from Canada, Denmark, and Norway, it would create a website 9 and as "RAIPON" it would begin to serve as a conduit for development programs throughout the Russian North. However, in the middle of the décade, such eventualities hardly could be imagined, either by myself, or seemingly by the leadership of the Association.
The state of the movement in Chukotka
Meanwhile, Indigenous intellectuals in the régions had been active for their own part. The locally published sources in Chukotka dating from 1989 to about 1993 give the impression of a growing Indigenous movement that paralleled the Moscow-based one. Magazine and newspaper articles tell the story of how an Association of Indigenous Less-Numerous Peoples of Chukotka and Kolyma 10 was created in 1990, and how a régional conférence was held in Anadyr' that brought delegates from each village in Chukotka (Grichenkovaia and Ivkev 1990; Tymnetuvge 1990) . A wellknown Chukchi intellectual, Aleksandr Omrypkir, was elected président of the new association. The Chukotka association had a charter and program similar to the national association, and similarly aimed to represent a diverse constituency, in this case ail of the various Indigenous peoples résident in Chukotka: Chukchi, Eskimosy 11 , Even/Lamut, Chuvan, Yukagir, Koryak, and others 12 . District, town and village chapters of this association were established throughout Chukotka, and sources convey an aura of excitement and optimism surrounding what seemed to be the growth of a movement throughout Chukotka.
When I arrived in Anadyr' to begin my research in 1995, I immediately visited Omrypkir in the office of the Chukotka régional association, which I expected to be a hub of activity, based on what I had read about it. Quite to the contrary, the office seemed tiny and desolate, and Omrypkir sat there alone. Our interviews were fascinating-he seemed exceptionally intelligent and well informed about the problems of Indigenous Chukotkans, particularly from a légal perspective. But the association held no regular meetings, it sent out no periodical newsletter, and there was no évidence of active participation by a constituent membership. It had an office, a tiny budget given by the administration, and a public réputation as being the one organisation that represented the views of ail Indigenous Chukotkans, but very few of them were involved in its day-to-day functioning. Yet aside from this association, none of my consultées was able to indicate to me any locus of an Indigenous movement 13 .
Assotsiatsia korennykh tnalochislennykh narodov Chukotki i Kolyma.
Kolyma is essentially the région that was left from the Magadan Province when Chukotka split off from it. Chukotka used to be subsumed within Magadan, but declared independence and had this affirmed by the Russian Constitutional Court in 1993. It is the only autonomous région in Russia to have separated from its parent province in this way.
It is the policy of Études/Inuit/Studies
to use the term "Yupik" (pl. "Yupiget"). However, it is inappropriate to use this terminology in référence to persons in Chukotka, as they do not use it themselves. Ail indigenous activists in Chukotka speak Russian, and for some it is their first language. The activists with whom I spoke in Chukotka do not use the term "Yupik" in self-reference; they use the gendered ternis "eskimos/eskimoska" (pl. "eskimosy"), which are not capitalized in the Russian. "Yupik" is used only in the name of the society organized by Chukotka's eskimosy (Obshchestvo eskimosov "Yupik") . When they do use a more spécifie local terminology, the terms "naukantsy" or "sireniktsy" or "chaplintsy" are used, which refer to the places of origin of spécifie eskimosy. Rather than impose language usage from another country upon the indigenous activists of Chukotka, I prefer to use their own terminology of self-reference. Since translating the term into English results in a term that may sound offensive or controversial to some ("Eskimo," which is frowned upon in Canada but which is in wide usage in Alaska by Alaska Natives), for the purposes of this paper I leave it untranslated, but capitalized to conform to English-language rules for proper nouns ^Eskimosy"). Late in the décade, the Anadyr' City Association of Indigenous peoples, (referred to locally as gorodskaia assotsiatsiia) began to be talked of as the "real" association, the one that actually did I was surprised to find so little évidence of the Indigenous movement I had read about, and for the first few weeks I felt perplexed as I sought to reconcile the information in the written sources with what I was observing on the ground. When I asked Omrypkir why the association seemed so inactive, he blamed the current financial crisis that had gripped ail of Russia. Fundraising was a perennial problem, he said. They used to collect dues from members, but now people were not even getting their salaries paid on a regular basis. The association was an officially registered social organisation (obshchestvennaia organizatsiià) in Chukotka, which entitled it to be included in the régional budget, and Omrypkir even collected a small salary from the régional administration at first. Nevertheless, Omrypkir lamented that the association did not have enough ready cash even to buy the paper, envelopes, and stamps it would take to send out any kind of newsletter to the local chapters of the Chukotka Association in the district centers and villages in order to maintain communication. A régional conférence of the association had been held in 1992, but since then they had not been able to afford to hold another one, although the association's charter stipulated that such a conférence must be convened every two years, during which élections must be held. Omrypkir had thus remained président by default.
The state of the economy had obviously caused hardships in Chukotka; nevertheless, I felt there had to be more to why the association seemed so inactive. Why, for example, was Anadyr's Indigenous community so little involved with the association when it was right in their midst? Anadyr' had an Indigenous population of about 1,500 in 1996 (out of a total population of about 13,000), and there was no financial barrier to communication within the tiny city. Anadyr's Indigenous community did maintain strong personal ties, even across "ethnie boundaries" (Chukchi, Eskimosy, etc.), through telephoning one another and visiting one another's homes. There were native-language radio and télévision programs (in Chukchi and Eskimoskii^4)
as well as a native-language newspaper (in Chukchi, Eskimoskii and Even) to serve as a locus of Indigenous identity and communication, although thèse ail had limitations 15 . Anadyr's Indigenous inhabitants were highly visible in society by virtue of their fréquent performances of Indigenous song and dance in traditional costume. By ail appearances, this was fertile ground on which the association could have promoted the full agenda of the Indigenous rights movement as it was articulated in the documents of both the régional and national associations. Enthusiastic and represent the interests of an indigenous constituency and have a stronger voice. It seemed to be a locus of anti-Omrypkir sentiment.
The spoken and written language that is used by Eskimosy in Chukotka is locally called eskimoskii (not capitalized in the Russian, but here capitalized to conform to English-language rules for proper nouns). Limitations included poor télécommunications infrastructure which meant the télévision and radio broadeasts were not received in some villages; the fact that many native-language speaking indigenous persons remarked that they had trouble reading the language in printed form, and therefore might not read the newspaper very actively; the subscription cost of the newspaper, which although it was negligible, was often more than some people could pay in the cash-strapped 1990s; and a concerted campaign to wrest control of the native-language newspaper and subsume it under the dominant Russian-language newspaper-which, once accomplished, caused many indigenous persons to develop a négative attitude toward the native-language newspaper. The latter situation is discussed at length in Gray (2005) .
optimistic reports in local papers provided some évidence that Indigenous activists had tried to promote this agenda in the early 1990s. So why in the mid-1990s did it seem that effort had fîzzled out? It appeared to me as a riddle.
Soviet activism and post-Soviet logic
I suggest that the answers to the riddle of the Indigenous (non-)movement in Chukotka can be found in the changes in power relations between increasingly marginalized Indigenous persons and increasingly chauvinistic incomers, 16 as a resuit of the transformation in régional political dynamics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many sources published during glasnost' place blâme on the policies of the Soviet period for destroying Indigenous social Systems, damaging Indigenous cultural traditions, and causing the loss of the Indigenous languages (cf. Schindler 1990) . Such accusations are more than justified. However, because the Soviet System was strongly centralized, there was at least some consistency to how policies were applied across the Soviet Union, and some recourse for appeal to the central authorities if abuses did occur locally. There was a script that was well rehearsed by ail, and this provided predictability-with a script, at least one can rely on most participants to perform according to their rôles.
This script in fact called for activists representing ail walks of life in the Soviet Union to play a rôle. Of course, ail manifestations of Soviet social activism-including Indigenous activism in Chukotka-always had to have the endorsement of the local branch of the Communist Party, and quite often were initiated by the latter. The activists who were the leaders of sanctioned social movements (or organisations, for ail movements were organised) were nearly always Communist Party members, and they understood the script and the rôle they were expected to perform. Caroline Humphrey deftly characterizes this phenomenon, proposing the term "evocative transcript" to refer to "the social reproduction of texts that circulate as the réitération of previous texts" (Humphrey 1994: 22) . Everyone knew the texts, and knew when and how they were expected to reproduce them, and the most successful performances came with certain rewards.
Given the common view that the Communist Party was the state in the Soviet Union, saying that the Party or Party members initiated a social movement or founded a social organisation would thus seem to be saying that the state itself initiated it. But the Party was the state and was not at the same time-somewhat in the same sensé that early 21 st century NGOs are non-governmental and yet governmental at the same time (Elyachar 2005; Ghodsee 2006 ). Locally, the Communist Party could function as a sort of "cheerleader" for social and political activism that aimed to communicate up to the state the need for change. While from the outside it may seem obvious that the The word "incomer" is a translation of the Russian term priezzhii, based on the verb priezzhat' ('to arrive, to corne'). It can imply those who are newly arrived, but in Chukotkan usage it is applied to those who have corne from the outside-whether recently or not-and show no commitment to Chukotka as their true home.
Communist Party was synonymous with a state that sought to repress its population, from the inside-and especially on a local level-it was entirely plausible to see it as an activist organisation working for the betterment of society, and to see oneself as a partner with it. In this sensé, awareness of the script could become deeply subverted, while attention was drawn to the positive aspects of one's social involvement. There was a space for citizen action in the Soviet Union for those willing to accept the limitations placed on that action, and many Soviet citizens made the most of that space. For those who wished to participate, the ways in which their activism was channeled by the Party was accepted as a given component of the social System. Thus, rather than seeing the Chukotkan Association as representing a new kind of activism, a product of démocratie "opening up" in Russia, it actually makes far more sensé to think of it as properly belonging to this very genre of Soviet citizen activism, the last in a long tradition of Soviet social organisations. This point was driven home to me when one Chukchi activist who was intimately involved in the establishment of the Chukotkan Association one day described to me how she participated in writing the charter of the organisation. Laughing at her own naïveté, she admitted that she and her collaborators had no idea how to write a charter, so they simply adapted the charter of the Komsomol (Communist Youth League).
In fact, there had been social organisations created in Chukotka long before glasnost' that strongly resembled the association and involved some of the very same Indigenous intellectuals who founded the latter. For example, in 1969, the Obshchestvennyi sovetpo rabote s naseleniem iz narodnostei Severa ('Social Council for Work with the Population of the Peoples of the North') was created in Anadyr' with officiai endorsement by the regional-level Communist Party. "The activists of the local {mestnyï) intelligentsia have opportunely begun to practically résolve, on a social basis, the problems of culture and daily life of the local population," stated the Chairman of this new council, thus seeming to imply that the council was formed as a resuit of a movement already initiated by thèse activists (Krushanov 1986: 108) . The council was described as having an "advisory character"; its members were elected from among the "more active and authoritative workers of the local intelligentsia." A few of thèse were named: "the engineer Iurii Nikulin, the journalist Tatiana Achirgina, the artist Ekaterina Rultyneut, and others" (ibid.: 109).
Some of thèse figures were later found at the forefront of post-Soviet social activism in Chukotka in the 1990s. Achirgina would go on in the 1990s to be one of the founders of the Obshchestvo eskimosov "Yupik" ('Society of Eskimosy "Yupik"') in Chukotka, and would serve on the board of the Inuit Circumpolar Council when the 
a song and dance group, went on to occupy a high-level managerial position in the Chukotka Department of Culture, and in the late 1990s she became a vocal advocate of Indigenous cultural revitalization. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, thèse individuals felt they were doing nothing so qualitatively différent from what they had done in the Soviet period. Although Western observers might put a négative spin on this and characterize them as "Communist holdovers," they themselves put a positive spin on it-they saw their own careers as a more or less seamless whole, and in their own minds, they were in the past, and continued to be, social activists, working as they always had to correct imperfections in society.
When the association was formed in 1990, it certainly followed the Soviet-era précédents for such social organisations, and it had the approval of the still existing Communist Party. However, this does not mean I am arguing that it was therefore doomed to failure, mired in the Communist System. On the contrary, given local political circumstances différent than those which arose in Chukotka after the collapse of the Soviet Union, such an "activist" organisation, regardless of being statesanctioned in the Soviet period, might have gone on to fulftl a transformative agenda.
However, the Chukotka Association faced a key obstacle. The rhetoric of the Indigenous movement described an ideology-driven System that had colonized Indigenous peoples and systematically sought to dismantle their social orders and replace them with a Soviet social order. But it was a System, and at least in that System Indigenous peoples had a rôle in the script; they occupied a position that fit into the logic of Leninist nationalities policy. The agenda of the Indigenous movement as articulated in the documents of the late 1980s and early 1990s was in essence to enhance the rôle of Indigenous peoples within that logic, giving them greater autonomy culturally, economically and politically. But the collapse of the Soviet Union also meant the collapse of so unitary a System of policy. In Chukotka, I would argue even more so than in other régions of the North in the 1990s, a new post-Soviet logic quickly developed that was nominally démocratie but promoted a local interprétation of democracy as a System in which society is an ethnically undifferentiated unit and majority opinion prevails. The challenge for Indigenous persons was no longer simply to enhance their part in the logic of the System, but to create from scratch a part for themselves within a new logic that was attempting to erase them from the script altogether as representing a minority voice that carried little weight and therefore mattered little. When a federally restructured post-Soviet administration took shape in Chukotka after 1993 18 , the non-Indigenous bureaucrats who controlled it began to recognise the potential challenge that an independent and internationally connected Indigenous organisation might présent. They quickly sought to co-opt the association and make it subject to their own agenda, which was decidedly hostile to Indigenous herself was a strong supporter of the Chukchi activist Vladimir Etylin when he ran for governor of Chukotka in 1996.
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Although many of the same people carried over from the pre-1993 administration, including Nazarov (see below), the power relations within the new administrative structure were quite différent from before.
Chukotkans and répressive of efforts to act autonomously as a sub-unit of society with spécial interests.
Disauthenticating discourses
Between 1991 and 1993, a new form of leadership arose in Chukotka, in the persona of its new "governor," Aleksander Nazarov. As a pro-democratic "reformer" Nazarov had won favour with then-president Boris Yeltsin and thus emerged the victor in a local power struggle with Vladimir Etylin (at that time the Chairman of the régional council) for control of the Chukotka administration (Gray 2005;  Thompson in press). At first subtly, later more blatantly, Nazarov developed a systematic, répressive chauvinism that played a décisive rôle in defusing the energy of the original Indigenous movement in Chukotka and accounts for the riddle of the "non-movement." Whereas in the Soviet period Chukotka had been created as a "national région," ostensibly in a Leninist gesture to the self-determination of its Indigenous inhabitants 19 , in post-Soviet discourse of the 1990s the région was increasingly claimed by incomers as a Russian space, "discovered" by Russian Cossacks in the 17th century.
More than once, Indigenous acquaintances pointed out to me what they saw as the irony in the fact that Chukotka had been an Indigenous space to begin with, and it was they who had allowed Russians to settle there. Incomers often countered by raising the technicality that certain parts of Chukotka were only recently settled by Chukchi, and therefore claims to indigenousness should be considered spurious. This debate was often carried out in the pages of the régional newspaper Krainii Sever ('Far North'). The tone of thèse articles differed sharply from that of the Soviet era, when a discourse of international friendship and brotherhood among peoples had prevailed, even if that discourse had always carried paternalistic overtones. Articles in the mid-1990s offered a belligerent rebuke to any attempt by Indigenous Chukotkans to assert a spécial identity as korennoi ('Indigenous') and claim rights commensurate with that identity.
A particularly indicative example of disauthenticating discourse that helped to defuse the Indigenous movement occurred in April 1994 when the Nazarov administration orchestrated what it called the "First Congress of Indigenous Peoples of Chukotka." At first glance, it seems a mistake to call this the first congress, since Indigenous Chukotkans had gathered twice before, in 1990 and 1992. However, those gatherings had been called conférences (konferentsiya) of the Indigenous association, while this was called a Congress (s } ezd) of Indigenous peoples. The person placed on the front line to organize this event on behalf of the Chukotka administration was
In 1980, the title "national" was dropped and replaced by "autonomous." This occurred across the Soviet North in ail seven of the régions (okrug) created ostensibly for Indigenous peoples, and marks a shift in national policy toward Indigenous peoples in the Soviet Union. However, the gênerai attitude embodied in the policy of that time remained paternalistic and benevolent.
Aramais Dallakian 20 , an incomer and the newly appointed head of the newly created Upravlenie po delam natsionaVnostei i migratsii ('Department of the Affairs of Nationalities and Migration'). My interlocutors described lavish sums being spent on the event out of the administration^ budget; participants were flown in from Moscow and Yakutiya, as well as from Alaska and Canada. In two interviews published in Krainii Sever, Dallakian spoke optimistically of the effect the congress would have on solving problems of "self-government of the Indigenous population" and other "purely économie and social problems."
Dallakian also made one important statement that foreshadowed the new postSoviet logic of régional politics. He said that the governor himself had appeared twice at the congress, and he continued, By the way, [the governor] was forced to take note of the terribly incorrect statements of our guests from abroad. They called for conducting similar measures exclusively on narrow national 21 terms, thereby programming international tension. That's not something we need:
in Russia, including in Chukotka, there are more than a hundred peoples and ethnie groups, and there should be no exclusions. We ail have the same problems in common, we must décide them together! [...] In the course of the congress, this was understood even by those who started out with a confrontational attitude toward the administration and the so-called "incomers" 22 .
Dallakian was attempting to claim that Indigenous-incomer tension was irrelevant to the problems that Indigenous Chukotkans were experiencing, going so far as to attempt to delegitimate the distinction between Indigenous Chukotkans and incomers by putting the latter word in quotes 23 . Dallakian's statement was made ail the more important by the fact that it was repeated two days later in an article by a reporter who had attended the conférence. She writes (at times almost word for word repeating Dallakian): Obviously mistaken was the statement of Kaleb Panaugve 24 , our guest from across the océan [Alaska] , about the necessity of carrying out such a congress exclusively "without white people" [...] Supposedly the "aliens," as a majority, steam-roller and harass the locals, and they need to attain their own political freedom. Personally, I think that we are ail one nation-severiane ('Northerners'). Suppose tomorrow the Ukrainians gather their own congress, then the Belorussians, then the Russians, then the Caucasians. But truly we ail have the same problems. Do we really need to solve them separately? Is this not absurd?
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The writer goes on to blâme such attitudes on Boris Yeltsin's statement that the régions should "take as much sovereignty as they can swallow," which she says led to the problems the country was experiencing with renegade régions such as Chechnya and Tatarstan.
Both newspaper pièces take particular aim (the first obliquely, the second more directly) at a comment made by an Alaska Native leader who attended the congress, Caleb Pungowiyi. As a political activist, Pungowiyi would have been accustomed to large gatherings of Indigenous persons in North America, such as the annual Alaska Fédération of Natives, which is indeed conducted by and for Alaska Natives with only token and ornamental participation by non-Native dignitaries, such as the governor of Alaska. The orchestrated character of the Chukotka congress would have been obvious to him, and he apparently expressed his distaste and incredulity openly. Dallakian's and the newspaper's attention to this particular moment of the congress bespeaks a sharp awareness of the close proximity of Alaska and the strong potential for Indigenous Chukotkans to be influenced by ideas picked up in visits by Chukotkan and Alaskans back and forth across the Bering Strait, which had been carried out since the first "friendship flight" in 1988 and the implementation of a limited "visa-free" travel régime for certain Indigenous Alaskans and Chukotkans who could demonstrate kinship links with the other side (Krauss 1994; Sheldon 1989) . Thèse visits would be made increasingly difficult throughout the 1990s until many of the early "regulars" simply gave up.
The implications of the social and political realities represented by attitudes such as those in the Krainii Sever articles-that Indigenous Chukotkans had suffered no more than any other "nationality," and in fact there was nothing unique about their problems-were just beginning to dawn on Chukotka's Indigenous inhabitants when I arrived in 1995, and I seemed to witness a long period of regrouping. Although throughout the 1990s every one in Chukotka was experiencing radical change that was difficult to adjust to, Indigenous Chukotkans carried a dual burden: they also experienced the angst of social, political, and économie insecurity of the post-socialist transition imposed on them. But for them, the period brought in addition a négative change in their status, an adjustment downwards to greater exclusion from the mainstream, to virtual disenfranchisement. Where Indigenous Chukotkans were seeking partnership with the new administration, as they always had done with the Soviet state, Nazarov's rhetoric announced a clear rejection of partnership 26 . To add insuit to injury, there was an increasingly open display of Russian chauvinism, and public déniai by those in power that Indigenous Chukotkans had any sort of unique expérience.
I have claimed that Chukotka differed in this respect from the rest of the Russian North in the 1990s. By the 2000s, as the phenomenon of the "natural resource oligarchs" began to unfold-wealthy businessmen who managed to get themselves elected or appointed heads of resource-rich régions in the Russian North-the distinctions between Chukotka and other régions grew less significant. Nazarov was a unique figure; in some ways, he was the last of the old party bosses in Chukotka, but one who worked under démocratie rhetoric even as he systematically reversed the effects of glasnost' in Chukotka. The governor who succeeded Nazarov, Roman Abramovich, is the first oligarch in Chukotka, and his initial inclination was to reopen the région; fédéral pressure has overcome this inclination and kept Chukotka closed, and has also worked the closure of other régions in the North that had been more open than Chukotka in the 1990s 27 .
Conclusion
By the late 1980s, Russia's Indigenous peoples were free in principle to join together with Indigenous peoples throughout the world in cultivating and promoting a Fourth-World consciousness, and many Indigenous leaders in Russia actively sought out and interacted with their Indigenous counterparts in other countries. However, in spite of the appearance in Moscow of an Indigenous association that clearly intended to represent the interests of Indigenous peoples of the Russian North as a whole, and a florescence of régional associations that popped up nearly simultaneously across the country, one cannot say that thèse phenomena were truly connected in a unified movement across Russia, even if only for logistical reasons. In fact and not surprisingly, the more far-flung the région, the less connected it tended to be to activity in the centre, and Chukotka, as the most far-flung région of ail, remained quite peripheral.
Yet it was not merely Chukotka's peripheralness that excluded it from greater intégration with a wider Indigenous movement in Russia throughout the 1990s; further explanation must be sought in the nature of local politics in Chukotka after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The belligerent and répressive policies of the Nazarov régime I am grateful to Alex King for pointing this out.
During the 1990s, my own stories of the difficulties I encountered while working in Chukotka were often met with surprise, even incredulity, by my colleagues who worked elsewhere in the Russian North; by the 2000s, I finally began to have the bitter "pleasure" of commiserating with the same colleagues as they began to share similar taies of fieldwork difficulties in their respective field sites that they had hitherto not experienced. deliberately sought to disauthenticate the legitimacy of the Indigenous cause, and to undermine the effectiveness of the association. The ousting of Nazarov in 2001 considerably lessened the aggressiveness of this policy. However, it would be prématuré to déclare that ail obstacles to the Indigenous cause in Chukotka have now been removed, and many Chukotkans remain critical of developments in their région, in spite of the seeming benevolence of the new Abramovich administration. By now, Indigenous Chukotkans seem to have gained at least a more solid political footing, and as their voices can more easily gain access to channels of communication, the rest of the story will be theirs to tell.
